

VERIFICATION VALIDATION METHODS



DIGITAL DEPENDABILITY IDENTITIES – A CONCEPT TO MANAGE COMPLEXITY

Creating formal traceability between engineering artifacts and safety case applied to phenomena signal models

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Digital Dependability Identities (DDI) [1,2]

- Framework to enable continuous formal traceability between safety artifacts and safety case
- Horizontal Traceability between different safety artifacts
- Vertical Traceability between safety artifacts and safety case

Built on **standardized** metamodels

for single aspects (e.g. SACM [3])

- Open Dependability Exchange (ODE) Metamodel is a format for technical safety artifact exchange between tool throughout the development lifecycle
- Algorithm support to **automate** tasks, e.g. change impact, consistency



Relationship between DDI instance and metamodel

For a concrete system, artifacts and the safety case are instantiated as

The DDI concept is built to support iterative extension & tailoring

\rightarrow In VVM: Reuse what is there and extended for new VVM methods/artifacts

[1] DDIs and the Open Dependability Exchange Meta-Model https://www.deis-project.eu/ [2] Reich J. et al. (2020) Argument-Driven Safety Engineering of a Generic Infusion Pump with Digital Dependability Identities. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-58920-2_2 [3] OMG Structured Assurance Case Metamodel (SACM) https://www.omg.org/spec/SACM/2.2/About-SACM

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How can we integrate VVM artifacts formally into the DDI? - Exemplary shown for the Phenomenon Signal Model

Phenomenon Signal Model (PSM) [4]

Formal method to analyze the ego behavior within a scenario, based on rules and facts, to support a safety evidence within a safety case.

Input:

Scenario, Ontology, Rules, etc.

Output:

PSM Graph that identifies rules and facts defining a safe behavior





Problem:

PSM should be formally referenced within the safety case and linked to input and output artifacts

Solution

Specify formal metamodels of VVM artifacts and integrate them in DDI package



[4] H. N. Beck, N. F. Salem, V. Haber, M. Rauschenbach, and J. Reich, Phänomen-Signal-Modell: Formalismus, Graph und Anwendung. 2021.

[5] Stream I/5a,b Contributions to a traceable behavior specification for automated driving systems using formal methods

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Example:

The PSM method and its input and output artifacts should support a safety case. In the example, the behavior of the vehicle at a zebra crossing is analyzed with the PSM method.

Here the arrows between exemplary artifacts show the horizontal traceability with regard to the PSM graph. The color of the safety evidence illustrates the vertical traceability.

Ontology		Scenario
Zebra Crossing Pedestrian		Zebra Crossing In front, Pedestrian nearby, Ego drives towards crossing
StVO	Rule	
§26	R1:If zebra crossing in front AND pedestrian intents to cross THEN stop	

Example input artifacts

PSM Graph

Here in Path S1, rule R1 was applied which led to the action stop and thus not to a collision. R1 reflects the StVO §26. All



Snapshot of a potential assurance case

Input Artifacts

All input artifacts are formally included in the DDI. Each artifact, like for example the rule R1, can then be referenced explicitly within the DDI.







Output

Set of rules and facts that define the ego behavior. These rules and facts provide an initial input to derive capabilities in the following steps.

Snapshot of a potential assurance case

